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Abstract: Theoretical propositions stressing the importance of trust, reciprocity and 
reputation for cooperation in social exchange relations are deeply rooted in classical 
sociological thought. Today’s online markets provide a unique opportunity to test these 
theories using unobtrusive data. Our study investigates the mechanisms promoting 
cooperation in an online-auction market where most transactions can be conceived as one-
time-only exchanges. We first give a systematic account of the theoretical arguments 
explaining the process of cooperative transactions. Then, using a large dataset comprising 
14,627 mobile phone auctions and 339,517 DVD auctions, we test key hypotheses about the 
effects of traders’ reputation on auction outcomes and traders’ motives for leaving feedback. 
Our statistical analyses show that sellers with a better reputation have higher sales and obtain 
higher prices. Furthermore, we observe a high rate of participation in the feedback system, 
which is largely consistent with strong reciprocity – a predisposition to unconditionally 
reward (punish) one’s interaction partner’s cooperation (defection) – and altruism – a 
predisposition to increase one’s own utility by elevating the interaction partner’s utility. Our 
study demonstrates how strong reciprocity and altruism can mitigate the free-rider problem in 
the feedback system to create reputational incentives for mutually beneficial online trade. 
 
Keywords: cooperation, trust, reciprocity, reputation, online market 
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1 Introduction 
Social exchange has always been an important part of human sociality and arguably a driving 
force in the evolution of the human mind (Cosmides and Tooby 1992). In archaic societies, 
social exchange spanned a network of multiplex relations and was accompanied by elaborate 
ceremonies. A long tradition of research in anthropology and sociology on social exchange 
began with the work of Malinowski and Mauss. Ceremonial exchanges, such as the Kula 
(Malinowski 1922) or the potlatch (Mauss [1950] 1990), were formal rituals characterized by 
solemnity, decorum and disinterested generosity and occurred side by side with economic 
exchanges, which, in contrast, were guided by utilitarian motives (Heath 1976). Social 
exchange was governed by norms of reciprocity (Mauss [1950] 1990; Malinowski 1926; 
Gouldner 1960), and a failure to reciprocate was punished by the loss of reputation and status 
(Mauss [1950] 1990; Blau 1964). 
 
With trade taking place over ever longer distances, markets transcended the borders of small 
communities, and there is historical evidence that social and economic institutions have 
evolved as a substitute for informal social control (Zucker 1986; Greif 1989). For example, 
trade in the early Middle Ages in Europe was characterized by geographical specialization, 
bookkeeping, and cashless payment. At that time, the Champagne fairs in France were a 
meeting point for traders from all over Europe. Milgrom, North, and Weingast (1990) discuss 
the emergence of a private adjudication system (the Law Merchant), which helped overcome 
trust problems among anonymous traders. Administered by private judges, it provided a 
platform for traders to settle disputes and document trading partners’ dishonest behavior. 
Along with a system of notaries, such an institution could track and disseminate information 
about a trader’s past behavior so that dishonest traders could be denied access to the market. 
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More recently, similar information-collecting institutions have emerged to overcome trust 
problems between money lenders and borrowers. The so-called credit bureaus function as 
information brokers that collect and collate information about borrowers’ liabilities, credit 
histories (in particular arrears and defaults) and other characteristics (Japelli and Pagano 
2002). Credit bureaus are run privately, often by a group of lenders, and the reporting of 
borrower data is voluntary. To overcome the free-rider problem in data reporting, the services 
provided by credit bureaus are based on reciprocity; only lenders who submit accurate 
information about their customers are granted access to a comprehensive customer database. 
This reciprocal information-sharing system creates financial incentives for lenders to 
contribute to the common good of customer information and for borrowers to maintain a good 
reputation by timely debt repayment. Japelli and Pagano (2002) show, moreover, that such 
information sharing is indeed associated with higher lending and lower default rates across 46 
countries. 
 
In a similar vein, cooperation in peer-to-peer online markets is sustained by an electronic 
reputation system that collects and disseminates information about traders’ past behavior 
(Kollock 1999; Resnick et al. 2000). In online markets, tens of thousands of anonymous 
buyers and sellers trade with each other every day. These traders are not connected through a 
social network, in most cases interact only once (Resnick and Zeckhauser 2002) and – when 
cheating – are unlikely to be caught and fined by a central authority as many of these 
transactions transcend national borders (Przepiorka 2013). Crucial for the functioning of the 
reputation system is traders’ willingness to submit feedback after transactions are finished. 
However, unlike in credit markets, information about traders’ reputation is a collective good 
that is freely available to anyone (Bolton, Katok, and Ockenfels 2004). Since there is a cost 
for submitting feedback in terms of time and effort, traders have no real incentive to submit 
feedback and a second-order free-rider problem may exist (Heckathorn 1989). Assuming 
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strict rationality, actors would not rate their trading partners and, consequently, the whole 
market would degenerate or not evolve at all. How is it, though, that those online markets are 
so successful and enjoy increasing popularity? 
 
Here we argue that other-regarding preferences such as altruism (Becker 1976) and strong 
reciprocity (Gintis 2000) play an important role in maintaining the provision of feedback in 
anonymous online markets. This feedback then generates the information necessary to create 
financial incentives for mutually beneficial trade. Based on a large sample of process-
produced auction data obtained from eBay (N ≈ 350,000) we first corroborate previous 
studies’ findings that reputation has a market value, thus making it rational for traders to build 
and maintain a good reputation. We investigate the effect of reputation on the probability of 
sale and the selling price in a high- and a low-cost product market (mobile phones vs. DVDs 
respectively) and under high and low buyer uncertainty (used vs. new mobile phones 
respectively). Second, we investigate traders’ motivation to leave feedback, without which 
reputational incentives would not accrue. Based on a large sample of timed rating events, we 
test partly competing hypotheses with regard to the possible motives behind traders’ voluntary 
contributions to the feedback system. In our analyses, we take advantage of the repeated 
measures obtained for the same traders, to control for unobserved confounders (i.e., 
unobserved heterogeneity). 
 
In what follows, we bring together different strands of research and describe theoretically as 
well as in a thorough empirical analysis the mechanisms that guide traders’ cooperative 
behavior in an online market. In particular, we show how the institutional set-up of an online 
market engages traders’ moral sentiments and material interests to create opportunities for 
mutually beneficial trade. 
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2 Theory and hypotheses 
An interaction between a buyer and a seller in a typical online-auction market can be 
conceived as a process comprising four stages. First (the initiation stage), a seller decides to 
initiate an auction and sets some relevant parameters. Second (the bidding stage), potential 
buyers place bids and the highest bidder gets the offered item. Third (the transaction stage), 
the buyer pays the highest bid (i.e., selling price) and the seller ships the item. Finally (the 
feedback stage), the buyer can rate the seller and, depending on the implementation of the 
feedback mechanism, the seller can rate the buyer. Ratings can be positive or negative, are 
mostly accompanied by a short written comment and are immediately available to all market 
participants free of charge. In the following section, we outline our theoretical underpinning 
of and hypotheses about online traders’ behavior at the transaction stage. Section 2.2 covers 
the feedback stage. 
 
2.1 Transaction stage 
The sequence of moves at the transaction stage is not predefined. However, since sellers 
cannot choose their buyers, most sellers demand advance payment and ship the item only after 
payment is received (Diekmann, Jann, and Wyder 2009). In this case, buyers cannot inspect 
the product before payment and a trust problem arises as sellers could deliver poor quality 
goods or keep the money without delivering at all (Akerlof 1970; Dasgupta 1988; Güth and 
Ockenfels 2003).1 How do traders overcome this trust problem? 
 
                                                 
1 Most economic and social exchange is sequential. An actor A transfers resources to an actor B and expects B to 
reciprocate at some point in the future so that both A and B earn the gains from trade. A trust problem arises 
when A cannot expect B to reciprocate with certainty (Coleman 1990: Ch. 5). We call  A’s expectation regarding 
B’s propensity to reciprocate “trust”. Thus, a trusting A is more likely to transfer resources to B. We call B’s 
propensity to reciprocate “trustworthiness”. B can be trustworthy because he or she is committed to act in A’s 
interest out of self-interest (Hardin 2002), or because of other-regarding preferences and internalized norms of 
fairness and reciprocity (for other notions of trust see Cook, Hardin, and Levi 2007). 
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Evidence from laboratory experiments suggests that there may be a significant proportion of 
trustworthy sellers who care about the outcome of their trading partners because of other-
regarding motives such as positive reciprocity, fairness considerations and altruism (Camerer 
2003). However, these trustworthy sellers will be driven out of the market because they 
cannot keep up with the cheap offers of dishonest sellers. Bad experiences with dishonest 
sellers will decrease buyers’ willingness to pay for a product and thereby reduce the 
trustworthy sellers’ incentives to stay in the market (Akerlof 1970; Yamagishi et al. 2009). 
Alternatively, sellers may be trustworthy because they are embedded in dyadic relations or 
social networks (Granovetter 1992; Jones, Hesterly, and Borgatti 1997; Gulati and Gargiulo 
1999; Buskens and Raub 2002), in which cooperation is enforced through direct and also 
through indirect reciprocity (Nowak and Sigmund 2005, see also Blau 1964) respectively. 
However, online consumer markets merely coordinate the supply and demand of end-product 
sellers and ultimate buyers; these markets are not characterized by customized and complex 
exchanges, and, as we will show below, repeated interactions between the same two traders 
are infrequent. Under these conditions, it is unlikely that network governance structures will 
emerge to solve potential exchange problems (Jones et al. 1997). Moreover, since online trade 
takes place across large geographic distances, it is also unlikely that offline commitment 
relations (Kollock 1994; Yamagishi, Cook, and Watabe 1998) or trust networks (DiMaggio 
and Louch 1998; Cook, Rice, and Gerbasi 2004) will form that would allow traders to obtain 
and disseminate information about their interaction partners. Finally, although online markets 
such as eBay try to establish norms of good conduct by providing discussion forums, chat 
rooms and clubs where traders have the opportunity to exchange information on selected 
topics, to our knowledge, there is no evidence that eBay traders have developed shared social 
norms of cooperation and, if they have, such norms will not prevent fraudulent traders from 
behaving opportunistically.2 
                                                 
2 eBay Germany has 14.5 million active users and we counted 142 eBay clubs with a total of 2686 members 
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In anonymous online markets, the lack of social embeddedness is compensated for through an 
electronic rating system that disseminates information about traders’ reputation in an efficient 
and systematic way (Resnick et al. 2000). From an organizational behavior perspective, an 
electronic reputation system is an exogenously established, fully connected network that 
embeds anonymous online traders in weak ties, through which information about their 
reputation is transmitted, without structurally limiting their choice of potential interaction 
partners and the pursuit of their goals (Uzzi 1997; Gulati and Gargiulo 1999). In other words, 
in an anonymous online market with a reputation system, traders can be conceived as 
structurally homogeneous and their interactions as isolated dyads (Granovetter 1992). The 
resulting social mechanism that resolves exchange problems is rather simple. With their 
reputation at stake, rational and self-regarding sellers who sufficiently care about their future 
business have a strong incentive to behave cooperatively. Even in an interaction with a buyer 
whom they are unlikely to meet again, these sellers will forgo the short-term temptation to 
abuse the buyer’s trust in order to avoid a negative rating that would hamper future business. 
However, market entrants have no reputation and are therefore likely to be distrusted by 
buyers. Consequently, in order to enter the market, sellers with no feedback record have to 
allow prices to compensate buyers for the risk they take when buying from new sellers. If new 
sellers sufficiently care about future business, their good reputation will reimburse them for 
this initial investment in the future (Shapiro 1983; Resnick and Zeckhauser 2002; Przepiorka 
2013).3 Thus, if buyers discriminate among sellers according to their reputation, selling prices 
                                                                                                                                                        
representing 0.019 percent of the active users (eBay.de, March 28, 2013). There are a somewhat higher number 
of participants in discussion forums but relative to millions of users and transactions, their proportion is 
negligible. Moreover, repeated transactions with the same trader are rare (see below). Thus, the density of the 
trader network will be close to zero, even for submarkets. Finally, online relations may be “too thin” (Hardin 
2004) to establish norms of good conduct to the same extent as offline relations would (Granovetter 1992). 
3 On eBay, traders can leave feedback only after a transaction, and for every transaction the market platform 
charges a small fee. Therefore, building a good reputation, even with sham transactions, requires time and 
money. This makes a good reputation costly to fake and the reputation system fairly robust against deliberate 
attempts to influence it. On platforms where the possibility to leave feedback is not restricted to the traders of a 
particular transaction, reputations can be faked more easily. Another aspect that stabilizes eBay’s reputation 
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will be positively (negatively) correlated with a seller’s number of positive (negative) ratings. 
Moreover, if the market does not clear because supply exceeds demand, an analogous 
hypothesis can be derived with respect to sellers’ positive (negative) ratings and the 
probability of sale. 
 
Previous studies have found a stronger absolute effect of negative ratings on outcomes than of 
positive ratings (Ba and Pavlou 2002). A possible explanation for this finding is that negative 
ratings carry more information because they express unmet expectations in relation to proper 
business practice while positive ratings merely confirm these expectations (Lucking-Reiley et 
al. 2007). Finally, with both new and used products a potential buyer may fear that the seller 
will not deliver after payment or that the quality of the item will be lower than advertised. 
However, in the case of used products, uncertainty is higher for the buyer because the 
description of the product condition is less standardized, leaving more room for dishonest 
behavior by sellers. Hence, a seller’s reputation may be more important and therefore exhibit 
a larger effect than in the case of new products (Kollock 1994; Cook et al. 2004). 
 
In summary, our hypotheses for the transaction stage are as follows: 
(H1) The number of positive (negative) ratings increases (decreases) the probability of a 
sale (H1a) and the selling price (H1b). 
(H2) The effects of negative ratings on probability of sale and selling price are stronger than 
the effects of positive ratings. 
(H3) The effects of positive and negative ratings are stronger for used products than for new 
products. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
system is that the platform bans traders with too many negative evaluations and may prevent them from opening 
a new account under a different alias. 
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2.2 Feedback stage 
We have argued in the previous section that the market value of a good reputation creates 
financial incentives for traders to behave cooperatively. However, rational and self-regarding 
traders will not provide feedback after a transaction is finished and thus reputational 
incentives will not accrue. Participation in the feedback system can be compared to voting, in 
that, just as with democratic elections, there is a collective good problem (Downs 1957). If 
citizens eschew the costs of voting, as is predicted by strict rationality principles, the 
democratic system collapses, as would the online market should no buyer provide feedback. 
Fortunately, however, a substantial proportion of citizens do vote and a large proportion of 
traders do leave feedback. Similar explanations can be given for both behaviors. 
 
Consider a one-sided reputation system in which only buyers can rate sellers after a 
transaction. There are several possible explanations for buyers’ participation in the feedback 
system. First, as suggested by signaling theory (e.g., Gambetta 2009), a buyer might leave 
feedback to gain a reputation for being an active rater. Such a reputation signals to the seller 
that the buyer will publicly comment on how a transaction plays out, which might enforce 
cooperative behavior on the side of the seller. Second, buyers might submit positive feedback 
because they are altruistic and the increase in the seller’s utility elevates their own utility 
(Becker 1976).4 Since we assume a decreasing marginal utility of positive ratings, the 
likelihood of an altruistic buyer submitting feedback will decrease with an increasing seller 
score. Third, some buyers might leave feedback because they gain satisfaction from 
contributing to the public good provided by the feedback system. This idea corresponds to the 
notion of “warm glow” altruism (Andreoni 1990; see also Dellarocas, Fan, and Wood 2004). 
Finally, there is good reason to believe that some buyers are willing to punish defection or 
                                                 
4 Note that Becker’s altruism model is agnostic regarding the emotional triggers of altruistic behavior. Regret 
and guilt, for instance, can be subsumed under the model.  
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reward cooperation without direct benefit. That is, giving feedback can be motivated by 
strong reciprocity (Gintis 2000; Fehr, Fischbacher, and Gächter 2002).5 Returning a favor 
with a favor and responding to misdeeds with sanctions is observed in experiments and seems 
to be rooted in human nature (de Quervain et al. 2004). 
 
Until May 2007, eBay had a feedback system in which both transaction partners could leave 
feedback within 90 days. In such a two-sided rating system, in addition to the motives listed 
above, the feedback stage is open to strategic thinking. Although both buyers and sellers can 
be led by strategic (and non-strategic) motives, it is primarily sellers who have an interest in 
acting strategically at the feedback stage (see also Bolton, Greiner, and Ockenfels 2013). For 
example, the best way for a seller to establish a good reputation is to engage in good conduct, 
but there is always a small probability that a buyer is dissatisfied for reasons beyond the 
seller’s control. To safeguard against a buyer’s (possibly unjustified) negative response, a 
seller will prefer to hold up the threat of retaliation. Because a negative rating is more 
detrimental for sellers who have not yet established a good reputation than for sellers with 
many positive ratings, we expect sellers with fewer positive ratings to be more likely to strive 
for the second-mover position at the feedback stage. On the other hand, a seller could try to 
elicit positive feedback from a buyer by giving positive feedback first. Such a strategy makes 
sense if the seller believes that the buyer adheres to a norm of reciprocity (Gouldner 1960; 
Resnick and Zeckhauser 2002). If sellers make such an assertion, then the buyer’s score will 
have a positive effect on the probability of the seller giving feedback first. A further variable 
likely to influence the seller’s rating decision is whether the seller has already received a 
rating from the same buyer in a previous interaction. At the time of our data collection, 
                                                 
5 Fehr et al. (2002: 3) point out that the “essential feature of strong reciprocity is a willingness to sacrifice 
resources for rewarding fair and punishing unfair behavior even if this is costly and provides neither present nor 
future material rewards for the reciprocator” (original emphasis). Behavior as defined by strong reciprocity 
cannot therefore be explained by reciprocal altruism (Trivers 1971) or by reputation and indirect reciprocity 
(Nowak and Sigmund 2005). 
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repeated ratings from the same user did not affect the reputation score. Hence, a seller had no 
reason to elicit further positive feedback from a buyer by giving positive feedback first (see 
also Dellarocas et al. 2004). 
 
For buyers, the non-strategic motives mentioned in the second paragraph of this section are 
still valid. In addition, if a buyer is motivated by strong reciprocity, positive feedback from 
the seller will further increase his or her likelihood of submitting a positive rating. In fact, it is 
hard to think of reasons why a self-regarding buyer would reciprocate a seller’s positive 
feedback. Such behavior would be an indication of strong reciprocity at the feedback stage. 
Furthermore, indirect reciprocity (Nowak and Sigmund 2005), that is, rewarding sellers for 
their participation in the feedback system, might be another non-strategic motive in a two-
sided system. According to indirect reciprocity, buyers will be more likely to give (positive) 
feedback to sellers with a good reputation.6 Finally, due to eBay’s reputation system ignoring 
repeated ratings, buyers should be less likely to submit positive feedback if they provided a 
rating to the same seller in a previous interaction. If no such effect exists, altruistic motives 
that are based on the buyer’s belief that the seller gains utility from receiving feedback 
(Becker 1976) can be ruled out. For our empirical analysis, we confine ourselves to the 
following hypotheses (see also Dellarocas et al. 2004): 
 
(H4) Reciprocity: If buyers and sellers are motivated by strong reciprocity at the feedback 
stage, their inclination to submit a positive (negative) rating increases after receiving 
positive (negative) feedback from the transaction partner. 
(H5) Effect of sellers’ score on buyers’ behavior7: 
                                                 
6 A high number of ratings can be interpreted as an indication of being an active rater due to the high correlation 
between incoming and outgoing ratings. 
7 The two motives hypothesized under H5a and H5b are not mutually exclusive and may both be present 
simultaneously in a heterogeneous population. Empirical estimates, however, will provide information about 
which of the motives is predominant. Other motives such as the “warm glow” or signaling might also be present, 
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(a) If buyers are motivated by Becker’s altruism, the seller’s score should have a 
negative effect on the probability of feedback submission. 
(b) If buyers are motivated by indirect reciprocity, the seller’s score should have a 
positive effect on their decision to provide feedback. 
(H6) Sellers’ strategic behavior: 
(a) Sellers’ inclination to make the first move at the feedback stage increases with 
their own score; and 
(b) Sellers’ inclination to make the first move at the feedback stage increases with 
the buyer’s score. 
(H7) Previous interaction: 
(a) Sellers are less likely to submit positive feedback if they have already received 
a rating from the same buyer in a previous interaction. 
(b) Buyers are less likely to submit positive feedback if they provided a rating to 
the same seller in a previous interaction. 
 
3 Previous findings 
Most studies investigating reputation effects in online markets analyze data collected from 
eBay, and most of these studies find evidence of a positive relation between sellers’ reputation 
and prices or sales. Due to space limitations, we provide a review of these studies in the 
online supplement to this article (for earlier reviews, see Bajari and Hortacsu 2004; Resnick et 
al. 2006). Here, we instead focus on a number of important aspects in the ongoing discussion 
about reputation formation in anonymous online markets. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
but we see no possibility to disentangle them with our data; these motives would be consistent with a null effect 
of sellers’ score on buyers’ behavior. Furthermore, effects as hypothesized in H5 could also be caused by fear of 
disagreeable e-mails by the seller if one does not leave feedback. However, we cannot offer any clear 
presumptions about how such fears would be related to sellers’ score.  
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In their review of 15 empirical eBay studies, Resnick et al. (2006) point out that the quasi-
experimental designs of these studies cannot account for unobserved heterogeneity in a 
satisfactory way. Thus, if unobserved factors such as the pre-purchase communication 
between buyers and sellers or the quality of the product description are correlated with sellers’ 
reputation, then the estimates of the regression coefficients can be biased. In our data set, we 
have repeated measures for a considerable proportion of both buyers and sellers. This allows 
us to cope with problems of unobserved heterogeneity by using fixed-effects regressions 
(Allison 2009). 
 
It has been argued that most eBay studies claim to estimate buyers’ willingness to pay for 
sellers’ reputation but, in fact, only estimate what buyers do pay, which is a poor estimate of 
their willingness to pay (Snijders and Weesie 2009). The argument is that the highest bids 
may depend on many other factors not observable in the data obtained from eBay. For 
instance, bidding is a dynamic process and potential buyers’ bidding decisions also depend on 
their beliefs about other buyers’ reservation prices. Moreover, potential buyers could consider 
several offers simultaneously, but their initial choice sets are unobserved or difficult to define 
(although see Livingston, 2003). In our study, we do not claim to be estimating buyers’ 
willingness to pay for sellers’ reputation. For the sake of our argument, it is enough to show 
that buyers, on average, pay more for sellers with a higher reputation and thus create financial 
incentives for sellers to behave cooperatively in the market. 
 
The Achilles’ heel of a reputation system remains market participants’ willingness to rate 
each other. If participants do not provide truthful ratings, the market loses its capacity to 
identify fraudulent traders and reputation loses its value. For buyers and sellers on eBay, 
Resnick and Zeckhauser (2002) report a rating frequency of 52% and 61%, respectively; 
Dellarocas et al. (2004) find 68% and 78%; and Jian, MacKie-Mason, and Resnick (2010) 
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report rates of 33% and 55%. Moreover, averaging across seven different countries’ eBay 
sites, Bolton et al. (2013) report a rating frequency of 71%. They attribute the high rating 
frequency to the two-sided rating system implemented on eBay. On the one hand, a two-sided 
system provides incentives to leave feedback because of positive reciprocity expectations. On 
the other hand, the threat of retaliation against a negative rating leads to a positive evaluation 
bias. Based on a data set of ratings obtained from eBay, Dellarocas and Wood (2008) also 
identify reciprocity as an important factor driving behavior at the feedback stage. Moreover, 
they suggest that not leaving feedback indicates dissatisfaction and, based on the information 
obtained from the observed rating patterns, they estimate the proportion of good, bad, and 
mediocre transactions. They show that the 99% positive rating usually observed on eBay is a 
biased estimate of the proportion of good transactions; accounting for the “sound of silence” 
(i.e., transactions where one or both traders did not leave feedback) gives an estimate of 79% 
and 86% for satisfied buyers and sellers respectively. In a similar vein, Jian et al. (2010) 
develop a model to estimate the proportion of different rating strategies from eBay feedback 
data. The authors assume three rating strategies (do not give feedback, give feedback 
unconditionally, reciprocate feedback) and estimate both buyers’ and sellers’ propensity to 
choose one of the strategies. They find that the reciprocal feedback strategy is chosen in 23% 
or 20% of the cases, whereas the unconditional feedback strategy is chosen in 38% or 47% of 
the cases by a median buyer or seller respectively. 
 
In our study, we complement these results by analyzing time-specific feedback decisions. 
Whether or not the trading partner has provided feedback first is an explanatory variable in 
our analysis. We estimate discrete-time event-history models, an approach which does not 
rely on restrictive assumptions about the timing distribution of traders’ feedback. We also 
account for unobserved heterogeneity by including buyer and seller fixed effects in our 
models. Note, however, that what we observe in our data is behavior and, therefore, any 
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inference we make about traders’ underlying motives is based on the consistency of the 
behavioral data with our theoretical propositions. 
 
4 Data 
Our data, collected from the German eBay platform, contains information on auctions of 
mobile phones and DVDs that ended between December 1, 2004 and January 7, 2005 (for 
details on data collection, see the online supplement). We restrict our analysis to offers from 
sellers in Germany and exclude private auctions, where the buyer is unknown, as well as 
auctions in which multiple pieces are offered that can be purchased by multiple buyers. Some 
auctions ended early because the seller withdrew the auction before the first bid, the seller 
stopped the auction with the current bid as the winning bid or the auction ended with a “Buy 
It Now” (i.e., fixed price) purchase. We exclude these cases from our analysis. Finally, minor 
inconsistencies in the regular expressions caused missing or ambiguous data on key variables 
for a small fraction of auctions, which we also exclude (in total, 14.5% of mobile phones and 
10.4% of DVDs were excluded for the above reasons). 
 
To estimate reputation effects on the highest bids in auctions, it is sensible to select a 
homogeneous good to avoid bias due to unobserved heterogeneity (Diekmann et al. 2009). To 
ensure homogeneity in our mobile phone data, we manually sorted out offers that contained 
complementary goods or multiple items (23.1%) and divided the sample into new (unused and 
in original packaging) and used products. The total sample therefore includes 14,627 mobile 
phones of seven different models, 37.6% of which are new and 95.7% of which received at 
least one bid (i.e., their auctions were successful).8 In our data, the mean selling price was 217 
Euros for new mobile phones and 150 Euros for used mobile phones (see Table 1 containing 
                                                 
8 We collected data for five more models, but we exclude these cases from our analysis because the models were 
released prior to 2004. The excluded cases are comprised almost entirely of used products and thus are more 
heterogeneous than the offers of newer models. Including these older models in our analysis does not change our 
main findings. 
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descriptive statistics of our key variables; additional variables are documented in Table A1 in 
the online supplement). To evaluate whether reputation effects can also be observed for low-
cost products, we analyze a sample of 339,517 DVD auctions, 53.3% of which were 
successful. We collected data on all DVD auctions in the mentioned time span, covering 
hundreds of different movies. Thus, product homogeneity cannot be assumed. Also, due to the 
lack of a reliable automatic categorization method, we do not distinguish between new and 
used DVDs. Moreover, unlike the mobile phone market, with 1.25 auctions per seller on 
average, the DVD market, with an average of 10.24 auctions per seller, is dominated by a 
relatively small number of professional sellers. 
 
We operationalize buyers’ and sellers’ reputation with their number of positive and negative 
ratings. Since the distributions of these variables are highly right-skewed, we take the 
logarithm of their values (after adding 1). Note that in terms of ratings too, sellers in the DVD 
market are considerably larger than sellers in the mobile phone market. 
 
[Table 1 about here.] 
 
At the feedback stage, we have the time (in days) until feedback for both the seller and the 
buyer of a successful auction. Recall that these variables are censored at 90 days. The mean 
duration seems to be lower in the DVD market, and positive feedback is very common, 
whereas neutral and negative ratings are rare. Negative ratings are more frequent in auctions 
with mobile phones than DVDs, indicating that problematic transactions are more likely when 
they involve more complex and more expensive products (although this could also be due to 
the lower degree of professionalism in the mobile phone market). Another important variable 
at the feedback stage is whether the seller or buyer has already received a rating from the 
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same person in a previous interaction. Such repeated encounters are more likely in the DVD 
market (5%) than in the mobile phone market (3%).9 
 
5 Results 
5.1 The effect of reputation on auction success 
In this section, we report and discuss reputation effects on sales and selling price. Table 2 
gives an overview of the results for our key variables. Although we control for many 
additional variables in our model estimations, due to space limitations, we report and discuss 
their effects in the online supplement only. 
 
Models M1 through M3 in Table 2 show the results from logistic regressions of auction 
success on sellers’ positive and negative ratings. In line with our hypothesis (H1), we find a 
significantly positive effect of positive ratings and a negative effect of negative ratings on the 
probability of sale for new mobile phones (model M1) and for DVDs (M3). Contrary to our 
expectation, we find no significant effects for used mobile phones (M2). Recall, however, that 
more than 95% of all mobile phones were sold, which leaves relatively little information for 
the estimation of the reputation effects on the probability of sale. 
 
[Table 2 about here.] 
 
Since we are dealing with auctions and not with fixed price offers, a large part of the 
reputation effect will be exerted on price. Table 2 also reports results from linear regressions 
of selling price on sellers’ positive and negative ratings (models M4 through M6). As 
expected, we observe a strong relation between a seller’s reputation and the highest bid in our 
                                                 
9 These numbers are calculated based on traders’ entire rating histories. They are lower bounds for the actual 
proportions of repeated encounters because transactions appear in the feedback history only if a rating occurred. 
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data. For both mobile phones and DVDs, the number of positive ratings has a significantly 
positive effect on price, and negative ratings reduce it.10 Since both the number of ratings and 
the selling price are log-transformed, the estimated coefficients can be interpreted as a percent 
increase in the selling price due to a one percent increase in the number of ratings (the 
elasticity). Thus, doubling the number of positive ratings increases the selling price of new 
mobile phones (M4) by about 0.005  ln(2)  100 = 0.35%. For used mobile phones (M5) and 
DVDs (M6), the effect of a 100% increase in positive ratings is about 0.55% and 3.7%, 
respectively. Evaluating these relative effects at the mean prices for new and used mobile 
phones and DVDs (see Table 1) yields absolute effects of 61, 97, and 27 cents, respectively. 
While these amounts may appear small at first sight, they are not, in fact, if one takes into 
account the range of sellers’ reputations in our sample, where differences of 1000% (e.g., 40 
vs. 440 positive ratings) and more are the rule rather than an exception. As predicted in H2, 
the absolute effect of negative ratings on price and sales is larger than the effect of positive 
ratings in all models (M1 through M6), although the difference is statistically significant at 
the 5% level only in model M4 (p = 0.003 for a two-sided test). In terms of absolute effects at 
mean prices, doubling the number of negative ratings decreases the price by 1.3 Euros, 2.2 
Euros, and 52 cents in models M4, M5 and M6, respectively. 
 
In line with our expectation that used products exhibit more uncertainty than new products 
and that therefore buyers will pay a higher reputation premium to sellers of used products 
(H3), the effects of positive and negative ratings on the selling price are stronger for used 
mobile phones (M5) than for new mobile phones (M6).11 However, recall that only for new 
                                                 
10 Censoring at the starting price might bias the effects of positive and negative ratings on price because our 
estimation is based on successful auctions only. To evaluate the robustness of our results, we applied various 
models that take censoring into account (such as censored normal regression and Heckman’s sample selection 
model). Results are very similar in all models (not shown). 
11 A bootstrap test of the joint null-hypothesis that the absolute coefficients of positive and negative ratings are 
not larger in the model for used mobile phones than in the model for new mobile phones yields a p-value of 0.04. 
This p-value is an empirical strength probability computed as the fraction of bootstrap samples in which the 
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mobile phones does reputation also have a significant effect on sales. If we take into account 
both outcomes (the selling price and the probability of sale), the total effect of reputation is 
even larger for new than for used mobile phones, although the difference is statistically 
insignificant (not shown).12 
 
As mentioned above, we cannot assume product homogeneity for our DVD dataset. We 
therefore replicate our analysis using a model with fixed effects for movie titles (M9).13 
Although smaller in absolute size than in the ordinary DVD model, the effects of positive and 
negative ratings are still highly significant. 
 
One could object that our effects are spurious because of unobserved seller heterogeneity. For 
example, some sellers might be more successful for reasons unrelated to reputation and, 
therefore, more likely to have a good reputation, resulting in a spurious correlation between 
reputation and selling prices. We can check this argument by analyzing the effects of changes 
in reputation for sellers who appear repeatedly in our dataset. We estimate models with seller 
fixed effects for new mobile phones and used mobile phones (M7 and M8) and a model with 
crossed fixed effects for sellers and titles for DVDs (M10).14 In the model for new mobile 
phones, the effects of positive and negative ratings persist, as does the effect of negative 
ratings in the model for DVDs, but for used mobile phones, the effects disappear. However, 
the fact that we still find reputation effects in most of our models provides strong support for 
the reputation hypothesis (H1). Note that accounting for seller fixed effects results in fairly 
                                                                                                                                                        
point estimates for the coefficients are in accordance with the null-hypothesis (see Davison, Hinkley, and Young 
2003: 151–152). The p-values for the separate hypotheses are 0.13 for positive and 0.10 for negative ratings. 
12 We determine the total effect by computing average marginal effects on the logarithm of the expected price, 
where the expected price is computed as the predicted selling price weighted by the estimated probability of sale. 
13 Title matches could not be found for all auctions, even after removing special characters. Therefore, the 
sample size in this analysis is reduced to 113,276 sold items. These items were sold by 15,545 different sellers 
and comprised 18,054 different titles with 6.3 auctions per title on average (the largest group being Harry Potter 
and the Prisoner of Azkaban, with 383 auctions). 
14 For the two-way fixed effects model, we use Schmieder’s (2009) implementation of an algorithm proposed by 
Guimarães and Portugal (2010). 
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conservative estimates of the reputation effects. The estimates are only based on changes in 
sellers’ reputations during the observation window of about one month, while all between-
seller variability is discarded. Consequently, the model estimations will be based on sellers 
with high trading frequency, which are more likely to have a good reputation, while 
newcomers, for whom an increase in reputation might be most valuable, tend to be excluded. 
 
In sum, our analyses replicate previous findings of a positive (negative) effect of positive 
(negative) ratings on sales and prices (H1) and we also find a larger absolute effect of 
negative ratings as compared to positive ratings (H2). Our additional model estimations also 
make it rather unlikely that the effects we find are spurious. However, the evidence for the 
uncertainty hypothesis (H3) is mixed; the reputation effect does not seem to be larger for used 
mobiles than for new ones. 
 
5.2 Participation in the feedback system 
As argued above, if too few traders participate in the feedback forum, the reputation system 
will be ineffective in detecting cheaters, and reputational incentives for (first-order) 
cooperation at the transaction stage will not accrue. However, we do find high levels of 
(second-order) cooperation at the feedback stage. Buyers submitted positive feedback in over 
65% of all transactions in our mobile phone sample, whereas only 3% of the transactions were 
rated neutrally or negatively. In the DVD sample, the difference is even larger. Buyers rated 
83% of the transactions positively; neutral or negative feedback was submitted in less than 
1% (see Table 1). Furthermore, Table 3 shows that more than 80% of the transactions in the 
mobile phone market and 90% of the DVD transactions were rated by at least one trader. 
 
[Table 3 about here.] 
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After an auction has ended, traders have 90 days to submit their feedback, and as traders can 
observe their partners giving them feedback, their feedback decisions are not independent 
from each other. Therefore, it is important to take the exact timing of traders’ feedback 
decisions into account when analyzing their rating behavior. Figure 1 gives an overview of the 
distribution of feedback decisions over the 90 days. The survival functions (upper panel) 
show how the proportions of buyers and sellers who have not yet given feedback decrease 
over time; the hazard rates for positive and negative ratings (middle and lower panel 
respectively) show, roughly speaking, the feedback probability on a given day conditional on 
no feedback had been given before; dotted lines indicate 95% confidence intervals (see the 
online supplement for computational details).  
 
While survival curves for sellers and buyers are synchronized in both markets, ratings are 
submitted faster in the DVD market. After 10 days, almost 50% of sellers and buyers had 
submitted a rating in the DVD market, but only about 40% had done so in the mobile phone 
market. Most notably, sellers are somewhat more likely to quickly submit a positive rating. 
That is, the hazard rate of a positive rating is higher for sellers than for buyers over the first 
couple of days in both markets. This indicates that some sellers might try to elicit a positive 
rating from the buyer by taking the first step. For negative ratings, the picture is different 
(note that the scale of the hazard rate is magnitudes smaller than for positive ratings). The 
curves are very similar for sellers and buyers, although in the mobile phone market the hazard 
rate for buyers is higher than for sellers. Furthermore, negative ratings are submitted more 
slowly than positive ratings. The hazard rates for positive ratings peak between days five and 
10, while they are highest between days 15 and 35 for negative ratings. Interestingly, unlike 
for positive ratings, we observe an increase in the hazard rates of negative ratings between 
days 80 and 90 (although confidence intervals tend to be large as data mass gets small in this 
region). This indicates that some actors may delay their negative rating to escape retaliation. 
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[Figure 1 about here.] 
 
The survival curves and hazard rates in Figure 1 only provide descriptive information on the 
distribution of ratings over time. To analyze the effects of covariates we divide the process 
time into days and approximate the hazard rates using discrete-time linear probability models 
containing indicator variables for different segments of the process time (i.e., we model the 
baseline hazard rates shown in Figure 1 as step functions).15 We also include two-way buyer 
and seller fixed effects in the models to control for unobserved buyer and seller characteristics 
that might otherwise bias the results. For instance, a positive relation between traders’ 
reputation and their rating probability could be due to the fact that frequent raters accumulate 
more ratings because their ratings are reciprocated. Likewise, transaction quality or speed 
might be higher among traders with better reputations, thus increasing the likelihood of 
receiving positive feedback or decreasing the time-to-feedback reaction. Such potential biases 
are kept at a minimum by including seller and buyer fixed effects in the models. 
 
Table 4 provides the estimates from the discrete-time linear probability models for positive 
and negative feedback from buyers and sellers in the DVD market (we do not present results 
for mobile phones here because the sample is too small for the two-way fixed effects 
estimation). The displayed coefficients have been scaled by a factor of 100; they can be 
interpreted as percentage-point effects on the conditional probability of submitting a rating on 
a specific day given that no rating had yet been submitted. 
 
[Table 4 about here.] 
                                                 
15 The segments are chosen such that in each interval a sufficient number of rating events is available. For 
positive feedback we use one-day intervals up to day 30, followed by two-day intervals up to day 50, followed 
by five-day intervals. For negative feedback the intervals in days are: 1–10, 11–15, 16–20, 21–25, 26–30, 31–40, 
41–50, 51–70 and 71–90. The exact choice of the intervals does not seem to matter much for our findings. 
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Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that ratings are driven by strong reciprocity 
(H4). All models in Table 4 include time-dependent variables indicating whether the trading 
partner submitted a positive, neutral, or negative rating first. Once a seller submits a positive 
rating, the buyer’s conditional probability of submitting a positive rating sharply increases by 
about five percentage points (M11); for sellers, this effect is even stronger (M12). Likewise, 
the probability that a negative rating will be reciprocated with a negative rating is very high 
(M13 and M14). Note that these effects are much smaller because of the low baseline 
probability.16 A somewhat inconclusive finding is the positive effect of a buyer’s negative 
rating on the seller’s probability of giving a positive rating. 
 
Moreover, our results support hypothesis H5a as opposed to H5b. The more positive ratings a 
seller has, the less likely the buyer is to submit feedback. That is, in addition to strong 
reciprocity, buyers’ rating behavior is consistent with Becker’s altruism rather than with warm 
glow altruism, signaling, or indirect reciprocity. Also, the remaining evidence in Table 4 is 
consistent with the view that buyers, in particular, take their interaction partners’ utility into 
account when leaving feedback. First, in line with our hypothesis H7b, buyers (and sellers) 
seem to acknowledge that traders to whom they provided a rating before do not benefit from 
another rating. Second, buyers are more likely to leave a positive rating the more negative 
ratings the seller has. This might reflect buyers’ willingness to support sellers who want to 
redeem their good reputation. Finally, we find that buyers (and sellers) are reluctant to give a 
negative rating if a trading partner already has many negative ratings, but they are more likely 
to give a negative rating to a trading partner with many positive ratings. This might reflect the 
                                                 
16 In the subsample used for the two-way fixed effects estimation, the average conditional probability of 
feedback being given on a specific day is about 3% for positive feedback and 0.01% for negative feedback. 
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fact that, after a failed transaction, traders’ disappointment with a trading partner with a good 
reputation is higher than with a partner with a bad reputation. 
 
We do not find support for our hypotheses regarding sellers’ strategic behavior at the 
feedback stage. Neither the sellers’ own number of positive ratings (H6a) nor the buyers’ 
number of positive ratings (H6b) exhibits a positive effect on the sellers’ probability of 
leaving positive feedback. Also, sellers are not less likely to give feedback to a buyer from 
whom they have received a rating in a previous interaction, which contradicts our hypothesis 
H7a. 
 
In sum, we observe high levels of participation in the feedback system, which seem to be 
mainly driven by strong reciprocity and altruism. Both sellers and buyers reciprocate received 
ratings from their transaction partners (H4) and appear to take their interaction partners’ 
utility into account in their feedback decisions (H5a, H7b). We do not find evidence for 
sellers’ strategic considerations, as our corresponding hypotheses cannot be confirmed (H6a, 
H6b, H7a). However, this does not mean that strategic motives are unimportant or do not 
exist; according to our descriptive results, sellers are more likely to submit a fast positive 
feedback, which can be seen as a strategic attempt to elicit reciprocation. 
 
6 Discussion and conclusions 
In commerce, trust problems have been ubiquitous ever since humans started trading 
commodities, and cultural evolution together with the creativity of “social engineers” led to a 
great variety of institutions that helped to mitigate these trust problems. The reputation system 
of the Maghribi traders in the Middle Ages described by Greif (1989), the “law merchant” 
system analyzed by Milgrom et al. (1990), the formation of formal social structures in 
nineteenth-century North America explored by Zucker (1986), and informal network 
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governance structures as described by Jones et al. (1997) are examples of institutions that 
evolved to overcome the uncertainty inherent in economic transactions. Factors such as the 
degree of social embeddedness of the traders (Granovetter 1992; Di Maggio and Louch 1998; 
Buskens and Raub 2002), the type of commodity (Kollock 1994), the complexity of the 
interaction (Jones et al. 1997) and, most importantly, the absence of timely and inexpensive 
provision of information about one’s trading partners’ reputation (Milgrom et al. 1990) have 
been identified as important determinants of their evolution. 
 
Recent technological progress has drastically diminished the cost of fast information 
transmission, and auction markets were among the first to establish online reputation systems 
for economic transactions. Based on a seller’s reputation, buyers can trade off prices against 
the possibility of being cheated, and the price premium for a good reputation provides a 
financial incentive for sellers’ cooperative behavior. What is more, traders do not have to be 
embedded in offline social networks to access information about other traders as long as they 
have access to the market platform online. In the last decade, online reputation systems have 
spread all over the web, and the technical possibilities of the Internet have brought their 
functioning close to perfection. However, the existence and stability of online reputation 
systems cannot be taken for granted. A reputation system’s effectiveness in promoting (first-
order) cooperation crucially depends on traders’ voluntary provision of feedback. As a trader 
gains no direct benefits from leaving feedback, participation in the feedback system is subject 
to a (second-order) free-rider problem. 
 
Our study investigates the role of reputation in promoting cooperation and the process of 
reputation formation in the field. That is, we explore the mechanisms underlying cooperation 
by observing transactions and ratings among traders in anonymous online markets in an 
unobtrusive way. We consider online markets as integrated systems of institutional rules that 
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govern traders’ decisions, and our analysis covers the entire chain of interactions between a 
buyer and a seller, starting with the seller’s offer and ending with either or both leaving 
feedback. Our theoretical considerations are rooted in classical sociology and anthropology, 
with their insights into the roles of trust, reciprocity and reputation in social exchange, but we 
also draw on recent findings from experimental social sciences. Based on a large sample of 
data from the mobile phone and DVD markets, we test various and partly competing 
hypotheses derived from our theoretical argument. 
 
In both markets, we find that sellers’ number of positive ratings has a positive effect on sales 
and selling prices, whereas sellers’ negative ratings have the opposite effect (H1). Moreover, 
in line with our hypothesis (H2), negative ratings affect sales and prices more than positive 
ratings. This corroborates previous findings that reputation has a market value and that buyers 
take into account information about sellers’ reputation when they place their bids (see the 
online supplement for a review of previous findings). However, the empirical evidence for the 
uncertainty hypothesis (H3) is mixed. As hypothesized, reputation has a larger effect on price 
for used mobile phones than for new ones, but this is not the case for the probability of sale; 
the gross effect of reputation, taking into account both the price and the probability of sale, 
seems even larger for new mobile phones than for used ones. A possible explanation for this 
finding is that used products attract buyers who are willing to take a risk and therefore do not 
take information about sellers’ reputation into account as carefully as buyers of new products 
do. 
 
At the feedback stage, cooperation is very high. Sixty percent of transactions in the mobile 
phone market and 80% in the DVD market are rated by both sellers and buyers, and only for a 
small fraction of transactions is there no rating at all. This is comparable to what Dellarocas et 
al. (2004) and Bolton et al. (2013) find in their eBay data. Our study corroborates, moreover, 
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that buyers’ and sellers’ behavior at the feedback stage is largely consistent with strong 
reciprocity (H4). Although there are no apparent benefits from reciprocating a rating received 
from one’s trading partner, the likelihood of providing similar feedback sharply increases for 
both buyers and sellers after receiving a rating. The effects are strong and highly significant 
for both positive and negative ratings. This is in line with the statistics reported in Bolton et 
al. (2013) and with what Dellarocas and Wood (2008) and Jian et al. (2010) find based on 
their model estimations. 
 
Besides reciprocity, altruistic preferences seem to motivate traders’ (in particular, buyers’) 
decisions. Buyers are more likely to give a positive rating to traders with few positive or many 
negative ratings (H5a). This contradicts Jian et al. (2010), who find that both buyers and 
sellers are more likely to give feedback to experienced traders than to inexperienced traders. 
We argue that this could be an artifact resulting from Jian et al. (2010) disregarding 
transaction quality in their model estimations. Transaction quality is likely to be higher for 
experienced traders and could thus lead to a positive correlation between traders’ experience 
and the probability of giving feedback. We circumvent this problem by including partner 
fixed effects in our model estimations; if we do not include them, our results are similar to 
those of Jian et al. (2010). Moreover, we find that buyers (and sellers) are less likely to give 
positive feedback to the same trading partner repeatedly (H7b). Both H5a and H7b are in line 
with Becker’s (1976) notion of altruism; our results are consistent with the idea that traders 
take their interaction partners’ utility into account when leaving feedback and are more likely 
to give feedback the more beneficial it is for their partner. 
 
Contrary to our expectations and unlike the results by Dellarocas et al. (2004), we find no 
evidence for sellers’ strategic considerations at the feedback stage. In particular, we find no 
support for the hypotheses that sellers strategically take into account their own or the buyers’ 
 29
score at the feedback stage (H6a and H6b). Dellarocas et al.’s (2004) conclusion was based on 
the finding that a buyer’s first move at the feedback stage had a negative effect on the seller’s 
overall probability of leaving feedback. We argue that this result could be an artifact resulting 
from their using a probit model; if sellers have a lower a priori probability of providing a 
rating, buyers will more likely be the first movers at the feedback stage. The event-history 
models used in our analysis do not suffer from this problem because the buyer’s first move is 
treated as a time-varying variable. Yet, traders seem to anticipate their trading partners’ 
reciprocal behavior, especially in the case of negative feedback, as some try to avoid 
retaliation by submitting their negative rating close to the end of the rating period. Thus, we 
cannot conclude that strategic motives are unimportant in traders’ decisions to leave feedback; 
they are difficult to identify in our data. 
 
In Gouldner’s (1960: 176) words, the norm of reciprocity is a “‘starting mechanism’ [that] 
helps to initiate social interaction”, and it is also a cornerstone in Blau’s (1964) social 
exchange theory. Both authors elaborate on the principle of reciprocity and outline its 
implications for the emergence and stability of exchange relations. Their notion of reciprocity 
and the reciprocity we observe in our data is similar to the notion of “strong reciprocity” 
pioneered by Gintis (2000). According to strong reciprocity, actors will return a favor with a 
favor and retaliate against an unfriendly act without expecting to be compensated for the costs 
they incur in doing so. In laboratory experiments, Fehr et al. (2002) were able to demonstrate 
that strong reciprocity is a key mechanism in promoting cooperation in voluntary contribution 
games and sparked a cross-disciplinary debate concerning the determinants of human social 
cooperation (Guala 2012). In our study, we show how the interplay of simple institutional 
rules and human motivation establishes a high level of cooperation among anonymous traders 
in online markets. Based on our findings we argue that, in these markets, altruism and strong 
reciprocity are likely to play an important role in maintaining (second-order) cooperation at 
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the feedback stage, which thus generates the information necessary to create financial 
incentives for (first-order) cooperation at the transaction stage. In other words, giving positive 
or negative feedback – a second-order issue – can be conceived as rewarding or punishing a 
trading partner’s first-order cooperation or defection respectively (Resnick and Zeckhauser 
2002). Given that the constrained set-up of online markets mirrors laboratory conditions 
relatively well, our findings bolster the external validity of experimental evidence of social 
cooperation and peer punishment. At the same time, our study makes apparent that 
unobtrusive behavioral data from online platforms need to be complemented with laboratory 
and field experiments, which are better suited to disentangling the various motives behind 
human behavior. Although strong reciprocity and altruism appear as the most likely motives 
behind the behavioral patterns we observe at the feedback stage, carefully designed 
experiments should be used to verify our results and rule out alternative explanations. 
 
Electronic reputation systems have been constantly refined to better meet the requirements of 
a steadily growing online community. In fact, the change in eBay’s reputation system in 
spring 2007 was guided by a thorough theoretical and empirical analysis which combined 
field data from online markets with evidence from laboratory experiments (Bolton et al. 
2013). The main concern with the old two-sided feedback system was that it might foster a 
positive evaluation bias. On the one hand, it encourages positive evaluations due to positive 
reciprocity expectations and, on the other hand, it deters truthful negative evaluations due to 
negative reciprocity expectations. Without abandoning the old system, buyers were newly 
given the opportunity to leave a more detailed and anonymous seller rating. That is, after a 
transaction, buyers could rate sellers on several attributes such as item description, 
communication, transaction speed and costs, etc., and sellers were not able to identify the 
buyer who rated them as they were only shown average feedback scores on each attribute. 
Surprisingly, although the costs for leaving feedback increased for buyers, both buyers’ and 
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sellers’ conventional rating behavior hardly changed ten weeks into the system change and 
70% of buyers who gave conventional feedback also gave detailed seller feedback (Bolton et 
al. 2013). This provides additional support for our assertion that cooperation at the feedback 
stage is motivated by strong reciprocity and altruism, rather than strategic considerations 
encouraged by the two-sided feedback system. 
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Figure 1. Survival functions and hazard rates of sellers’ and buyers’ rating decisions 
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Table 1. Means and standard deviations of key variables 
 New mobile 
phones 
Used mobile 
phones 
DVDs 
Seller:       
Seller’s positive ratings (log) 3.77 (1.59) 3.74 (1.61) 7.00 (2.65) 
Seller’s negative ratings (log) .42 (.70) .47 (.71) 2.00 (2.01) 
Buyer (if sold):       
Buyer’s positive ratings (log) 3.06 (1.70) 3.16 (1.83) 3.92 (1.69) 
Buyer’s negative ratings (log) .27 (.53) .32 (.62) .28 (.54) 
Feedback (if sold):       
Time until seller feedback (censored) 32.6 (35.3) 36.5 (36.7) 24.9 (30.1) 
Positive seller feedback .736  .685  .843  
Neutral seller feedback  .002  .005  .001  
Negative seller feedback .012  .016  .003  
Seller has previous rating from buyer .032  .031  .049  
Time until buyer feedback (censored) 33.9 (35.7) 39.0 (36.8) 25.2 (30.2) 
Positive buyer feedback .706  .656  .835  
Neutral buyer feedback .007  .011  .004  
Negative buyer feedback .019  .020  .004  
Buyer has previous rating from seller .030  .037  .049  
Auction:       
Successful auction .958  .956  .533  
Selling price in Euros (if sold) 216.7 (37.4) 150.3 (47.1) 7.4 (10.2) 
Number of observations 5499 9128 339517 
Number of sellers 4341 7687 33166 
Number of buyers 4881 7454 100046 
Notes: Descriptive statistics of further control variables that are used in our model estimations are listed in Table 
A1 in the online supplement. 
 37
Table 2. Effect of reputation on sales and prices 
 Product Sold (0/1) Selling Price 
 
Selling Price (with Fixed Effects) 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9 M10 
 New 
mobile 
phones 
Used 
mobile 
phones 
DVDs New 
mobile 
phones 
Used 
mobile 
phones 
DVDs New 
mobile 
phones 
Used 
mobile 
phones 
DVDs DVDs 
Seller’s positive ratings (log) .344* 
(.136) 
-.019 
(.064) 
.117** 
(.040) 
.005*** 
(.001) 
.008* 
(.003) 
.053*** 
(.015) 
.027** 
(.010) 
-.002 
(.045) 
.016*** 
(.002) 
.005 
(.007) 
Seller’s negative ratings (log) -.670* 
(.301) 
-.207 
(.132) 
-.145* 
(.058) 
-.011*** 
(.002) 
-.018** 
(.006) 
-.101** 
(.035) 
-.055 
(.034) 
-.025 
(.033) 
-.012** 
(.005) 
-.036** 
(.014) 
McFadden R-squared .858 .678 .133        
R-Squared    .844 .513 .111     
Number of observations 5499 9128 339517 5269 8727 180881 1612 1944 113276 103030 
Number of sellers 4341 7687 33166 4242 7474 30018 585 691  6901 
Number of titles         18054 15964 
Notes: M1-M3: Coefficient estimates of logistic regressions are shown; the binary dependent variable is equal to one for successful auctions. M4-M6: Coefficient estimates of 
OLS regressions are shown; the dependent variable is the logarithm of the selling price (in Euros). M7-M10: Coefficient estimates of fixed-effects regressions are shown (seller 
fixed effects in M7 and M8, title fixed effects in M9, title and seller fixed effects in M10); the dependent variable is the logarithm of the selling price (in Euros). Numbers in 
parentheses are robust standard errors (adjusted for seller-clusters; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 for two-sided tests). The models contained various control variables 
(starting price, length of product description, number of competing offers, and dummies for private profile, verified identity, Me-Page, PowerSeller, auction picture, thumbnail 
listing, bold listing, payment modes, auction duration, time and date of auction ending, and product subcategory); for detailed results see the online supplement. 
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Table 3. Feedback patterns (%) 
 Mobile phones DVDs 
Auctions with mutual feedback:   
Buyer rated first 32.3 48.6 
Seller rated first 28.1 30.2 
Simultaneous .1 .3 
Auctions with buyer feedback only 10.1 5.1 
Auctions with seller feedback only 11.8 5.7 
Auctions without feedback 17.7 10.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Observations 13996 180881 
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Table 4. Hazards of positive and negative feedback in the DVD market 
 Positive Feedback Negative Feedback 
 
 M11 M12 M13 M14 
 Buyer Seller Buyer Seller 
Positive first move by partner (time-
dependent) 
5.106*** 
(.112) 
13.754*** 
(1.013) 
.003 
(.004) 
-.006** 
(.002) 
Neutral first move by partner (time-
dependent) 
.410 
(.732) 
2.176*** 
(.461) 
-.011** 
(.004) 
.440*** 
(.109) 
Negative first move by partner 
(time-dependent) 
-.544 
(.327) 
1.859*** 
(.461) 
.535** 
(.166) 
1.871*** 
(.311) 
Positive ratings (log) -.880*** 
(.183) 
-.421 
(.234) 
-.025* 
(.012) 
-.012** 
(.004) 
Negative ratings (log) -.616 
(.508) 
-.225 
(.258) 
-.102* 
(.051) 
-.008 
(.006) 
Partner’s positive ratings (log) -.840*** 
(.137) 
-.259 
(.269) 
.017*** 
(.005) 
.021*** 
(.006) 
Partner’s negative ratings (log) 1.023*** 
(.259) 
-.894 
(.755) 
-.043** 
(.014) 
-.059 
(.035) 
Previous interaction rating:     
Received only -.067 
(.459) 
.943 
(.596) 
  
Provided only -2.051*** 
(.428) 
-1.448* 
(.676) 
  
Received and provided -1.147*** 
(.219) 
-.158 
(.286) 
  
Received or provided   .002 
(.005) 
.006* 
(.003) 
Number of observations 96055 96055 96055 96055 
Number of events 80601 80343 310 223 
Number of sellers 9309 9309 9309 9309 
Number of buyers 26188 26188 26188 26188 
Notes: The table shows coefficient estimates for the effects on the conditional probability of submitting a rating 
on a specific day given that no rating had been submitted yet (scaled by a factor of 100) for discrete-time linear 
probability models with seller and buyer fixed effects (standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for buyer-clusters 
in M11 and M13 and for seller-clusters in M12 and M14; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 for two-sided 
tests). Time indicators parameterizing the baseline hazard are not displayed. 
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Literature review 
There are several empirical studies investigating the effects of reputation in online markets 
(for earlier reviews, see Bajari and Hortacsu 2004; Resnick et al. 2006). Most of these studies 
analyze auction data collected from the online market platform eBay (for other platforms, see 
Ockenfels 2003; Snijders and Zijdeman 2004; Diekmann et al. 2009; Snijders and Weesie 
2009) and use statistical models to estimate the effects of seller ratings on selling price and 
probability of sale. The studies employ data sets of different sizes (ranging from 100 to 
340,000 cases) and covering various commodities (guitars, coins, stamps, mobile phones, 
DVDs, etc.). They differ in the definition of the dependent variable, the operationalization of 
sellers’ reputation, and the control variables included in the models. The majority of the 
studies estimate the elasticity or semi-elasticity of the selling price with respect to the number 
of positive and negative ratings or with respect to the “score” (positive minus negative 
ratings) and account for censoring (i.e. that prices are unobserved for unsold items). 
Some studies provide mixed results (Standifird 2001; Bajari and Hortacsu 2003; Lucking-
Reiley 2007) or do not support the reputation hypothesis (Eaton 2005; Cabral and Hortacsu 
2010). In the majority of studies, however, consistent evidence for a positive relation between 
sellers’ reputation and selling price is found (McDonald and Slawson 2002; Melnik and Alm 
2002; 2005; Dewan and Hsu 2004; Snijders and Zijdeman 2004; Berger and Schmitt 2005; 
Livingston 2005; Dewally and Ederington 2006; Houser and Wooders 2006; Przepiorka 
2013). With respect to the probability of sale, the evidence is less conclusive. While the 
results of Dewan and Hsu (2004), Hsu, Hannan and Koçak (2009), and Przepiorka (2013) 
support the hypothesis of a positive (negative) relation between positive (negative) ratings and 
sales, Berger and Schmitt (2005), Eaton (2005), and Cabral and Hortacsu (2010) find no 
support or mixed evidence. Snijders and Zijdeman (2004) even find a negative relation 
between the score and probability of sale.1 
Apart from variables accounting for product characteristics (e.g. brands, book values, 
condition, etc.), the explanatory and control variables most frequently used are the starting 
price, the number of bids or bidders, the existence of a product picture, auction duration, 
whether or not the offer ends on a weekend, the availability of secure payment methods, and 
                                                 
1 Snijders and Zijdeman (2004) and Eaton (2005) do not include the starting bid (i.e. minimum price) in their 
model. If the starting bid is negatively (positively) correlated with sellers’ positive (negative) ratings (see, for 
example, Przepiorka 2013), the corresponding estimates of the reputation effects can be biased in the opposite 
direction. 
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whether or not the seller set a secret reserve price. While the starting price consistently and in 
line with expectations has a significantly negative effect on sales (Dewan and Hsu 2004; 
Berger and Schmitt 2005; Cabral and Hortacsu 2010; Przepiorka 2013), the merit of its 
inclusion in a model for the selling price is debatable. On the one hand, the selling price is 
left-censored at the starting price and, therefore, the effect of the starting price will be 
overestimated in a standard regression model. On the other hand, the starting price may have 
a genuine effect on the selling price. For example, a high starting price may be a signal of 
superior product quality or, conversely, a low starting price may attract more potential buyers 
(see Livingston 2003). Consequently, reputation effects can be biased in models that do not 
control for starting prices. The number of bids and the number of bidders are endogenous 
variables mediating the effects of reputation and should not be included in the model; the 
same is true for all buyer characteristics. 
Providing a picture of the offered item is found to increase selling price by Snijders and 
Zijdeman (2004), Eaton (2005), and Dewally and Ederington (2006), as well as the 
probability of sale by Snijders and Zijdeman (2004). However, Eaton (2005) and Cabral and 
Hortacsu (2010) report a decreasing effect on the probability of sale and Melnik and Alm 
(2002; 2005) did not find any effects whatsoever in regard to the product picture. Auction 
duration is found to have no effect (Melnik and Alm 2002; 2005; Houser and Wooders 2006) 
or a positive effect on sales (Dewan and Hsu 2004; Cabral and Hortacsu 2010; Przepiorka 
2013) and prices (Dewally and Ederington 2006; Lucking-Reiley et al. 2007; Cabral and 
Hortacsu 2010; Przepiorka 2013). Results with respect to an auction ending on a weekend are 
mixed (Melnik and Alm 2002; 2005; Dewan and Hsu 2004; Lucking-Reiley et al. 2007; 
Przepiorka 2013). Moreover, with the exception of two studies (Cabral and Hortacsu 2010; 
Przepiorka 2013), there is no evidence that the availability of a secure payment method 
positively affects sales or prices (Melnik and Alm 2002; 2005; Berger and Schmitt 2005; 
Houser and Wooders 2006). Finally, secret reserve prices are commonly used in online 
auction markets in the US or the UK, but on eBay Germany, in most product categories, 
sellers do not have a possibility to set secret reserve prices. If sellers set a secret reserve price, 
a transaction takes place only if the highest bid reaches that threshold. While two studies find 
a positive and significant effect of a secret reserve price on selling price (Dewan and Hsu 
2004; Lucking-Reiley et al. 2007), results are mixed in one study (Standifird 2001) and two 
further studies find a significantly negative effect (Bajari and Hortacsu 2003; Dewally and 
Ederington 2006). 
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Details of data collection 
We collected data on a total of 1,084,882 auctions of various products on the German eBay 
market platform between November 7, 2004 and January 7, 2005. Information on auction 
characteristics was gathered using a computer program written to observe auctions for 
scientific analysis. Based on a set of 144 eBay categories (e.g. “Sony-Ericsson T610”), the 
first program maintained a directory of identification numbers and prospective end dates of 
new auctions that was updated daily. The auctions in this list were then processed sequentially 
by a second program, which scanned an auction’s pages once the end date was reached. The 
following pages were accessed and stored in a local database: (1) the auction’s main page (the 
“item page”); (2) the list of bids; (3) the profile page of the seller; (4) the profile page of the 
buyer; (5) the page listing other items being offered by the seller; and (6) the page listing 
offers by the buyer. The information on these pages was extracted using regular expressions 
and stored in database fields. For the item page, the HTML source code was also stored. After 
90 days, the maximum duration for submitting feedback, a third program recorded the entire 
feedback history of the seller and the buyer involved in the transaction. 
The usual procedure on eBay is to handle transactions in the manner of an English auction, 
but the system also allows sellers to set a so-called “Buy It Now” price at which the product 
can be purchased immediately. We recorded data on offers where the English auction 
mechanism was used, possibly in combination with a Buy It Now price, but disregarded offers 
in which the seller disabled the English auction mechanism and employed a Buy It Now price 
only. 
Due to an error, only partial data was recorded for auctions with more than 18 bids. We tried 
to recover the missing data after detecting the problem, but this was only possible for auctions 
that ended on December 1, 2004 or later. Auctions that had ended earlier were taken offline 
and we could not retrieve them using the item number. To have complete data and a well-
defined sample, we therefore restricted our analysis to auctions that ended between December 
1, 2004 and January 7, 2005. 
Control variables included in the models in Table 2 
Apart from positive and negative ratings, we controlled for other seller characteristics, such as 
whether they had a private profile, a verified identity, a Me-Page or PowerSeller status.2 
                                                 
2 A private profile means that, although rating statistics are visible, text feedback is hidden from other users (and 
“private” is displayed next to the user’s name instead of the feedback score); a verified identity can be obtained 
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These attributes are more common for sellers in the DVD market than for sellers in the mobile 
phone market, which indicates that professionalism is more pronounced in the latter (see 
Table A1). 
In addition to the product subcategories (model for mobile phones, genre for DVDs), control 
variables included the starting price (minimum bid; models M1–M3 only), the duration of the 
auction, the payment modes offered, the (logarithm of the) number of characters used in the 
product description (as a proxy for the amount of information provided about the offered 
item), whether a picture was provided, and whether the auction was highlighted in eBay’s list 
of offers using boldface or a picture thumbnail (eBay charges a small fee for each of these 
options). We further included a variable called “competition” that captures the (logarithm of 
the) number of similar offers that were active at the time the auction ended (same model and 
same new/used status in the case of mobile phones and same genre in the case of DVDs). 
Finally we included variables for the date and time the auction ended. In our models we used 
dummy variables for the week (the observation window covers six weeks), the weekday (plus 
a dummy for December 24/25 or December 31/January 1), and the daytime (one eight-hour 
interval starting at midnight followed by four-hour intervals in the case of mobile phones; two 
four-hour intervals starting at midnight and at 4 a.m. followed by hourly intervals in the case 
of DVDs). 
Unfortunately, we were not able to collect reliable information on shipping costs, which are 
usually charged by the seller in addition to the selling price. We therefore did not include such 
a variable in our models. Furthermore, we did not include the number of bids or buyer 
characteristics as explanatory variables because these variables are endogenous. 
Discussion of the effects of the control variables in the models in Table 2 
Results for the full models for the probability of sale (M1–M3) are displayed in Table A2. 
Regarding seller characteristics other than positive and negative ratings, no clear pattern can 
be found. The large negative effect of a seller’s verified identity in model M1 may be an 
artifact driven by the small number of sellers with this attribute. Not surprisingly, the starting 
price is a strong determinant of sales in all models. The higher the starting price, the less 
likely it is that the item will be sold. 
                                                                                                                                                        
for a small fee by proving one’s identity at a post office; a Me-Page is a user’s homepage on eBay that can be 
used to provide additional information on a business or person; and PowerSeller status is granted to professional 
sellers with a certain trade volume and a good feedback record. 
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As expected, the level of competition (the number of similar offers currently on the market) 
exerts a negative effect on the chances of selling a product (negative effect in all models, but 
not significant for new mobiles). The options to increase the visibility of an auction in the list 
of offers (thumbnail, boldface) seem to serve their purpose, but their effects are only 
significant in the model for DVDs. The description length has the expected positive effect for 
(new) mobile phones, but negatively affects DVD sales. An ad hoc explanation for this 
counter-intuitive finding could be that an extensive description is valuable for complex goods 
such as mobile phones, but is irrelevant or might even raise suspicion in the case of an item 
such as a DVD. Furthermore, not providing a picture has a negative effect for (used) mobile 
phones, but does not affect the sales of DVDs. The models also contain a number of dummy 
variables to control for the payment modes offered (bank transfer, PayPal or credit card, cash 
on pick up, cash on delivery), auction duration (one, three, five, seven or 10 days), the time-
point of the end of the auction (using a total of 16 and 29 parameters for mobile phones and 
DVDs, respectively; see the description of the control variables above), and the product 
subcategory (seven mobile phone models and seven DVD genres). For these groups of 
variables, joint tests are reported in the lower panel of the table without listing the single 
coefficients. The product subcategory is highly significant in all models, the auction duration 
is significant for DVDs but not for mobile phones, and the time-point of the end of the auction 
is significant for DVDs and used mobile phones but not for new mobile phones. 
Results for the full models for the selling price (M4–M10) are displayed in Table A3 and in 
Table A4. Positive and negative ratings are not the only source of information a buyer can use 
to assess a seller and his or her products. Auction characteristics such as a picture and the 
description length also have a positive effect on price for both new and used mobile phones. 
We also observe a positive effect of the description length for DVDs (counteracting the 
negative effect on the probability of sale), but providing a picture, again, seems to be less 
important for DVDs. Seller characteristics such as a verified identity, a Me-Page or 
PowerSeller status do not exert a positive effect on price. A likely reason for the lack of an 
effect of PowerSeller status is that PowerSeller status can only be acquired by sellers who 
already have a high number and proportion of positive ratings. Because of the decreasing 
marginal effect of positive information, PowerSeller status does not contribute much to 
increase a seller’s trustworthiness and therefor is discarded by potential buyers. Moreover, 
sellers with a private profile do not seem to be disadvantaged. This might appear surprising, 
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but recall that a private profile does not hide the seller’s feedback statistics but only the 
corresponding text comments. 
In accordance with theoretical considerations, more intense competition lowers the price for 
mobile phones. For DVDs, no competition effect can be found, but this is not very surprising 
given the broad nature of the competition measure in this case (recall, however, that 
competition had an effect on sales of DVDs; see Table A2). Similarly, increasing the visibility 
of an offer using a thumbnail or bold listing seems to attract bidders and, as expected, increase 
the price. Payment modes offered take up some of the unexplained variance except for used 
mobile phones. The auction duration does not have an impact on price, but there are 
significant timing effects. In the case of mobile phones, the model makes a large difference 
and there are also some price differences among DVD genres. 
We do not include the starting price in Models M4–M10 because the selling price is censored 
at the starting price (causing the coefficient for the starting price to be positively biased). 
Consistent estimates for the effect of the starting price can be obtained via censored 
regression. In our case, the starting price exerts a weak positive effect for used mobile phones 
and DVDs, but not for new mobile phones (not shown). 
Computation of hazard rates and confidence intervals in Figure 1 
The displayed hazard rates are kernel-density estimates based on nonparametric hazard 
components, applying linear boundary correction at days 0 and 90 (Jones 1993) and using a 
direct plug-in automatic bandwidth (Wand and Jones 1995), as implemented by Jann (2005). 
The dotted lines are normal approximation bootstrap confidence intervals taking into account 
clustering of sellers and buyers, respectively. 
Model diagnostics 
All reported results are fairly robust against changes in model specifications. For example, the 
exact choice of control variables does not affect the effects of key variables much. Because a 
selling price cannot be smaller than the starting price we also replicated the results for the 
selling price (M4–M6) using models for censored data (censored normal regression, censored 
normal regression with heteroscedastic errors, Heckman selection regression, censored 
quantile regression). In all variants the effects of the reputation variables were highly 
significant. Furthermore, the functional forms of effects of continuous variables were 
evaluated using graphical methods. No major deviations from the chosen forms in the 
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reported models were detected. Multicollinearity does not seem to be a problem either. The 
only variable that reaches a substantial value for the variance inflation factor is our measure 
for competition, which strongly depends on the auction date and time. However, excluding 
competition from the models does not change our findings. Finally, the results do not seem to 
be driven by outliers. We replicated the models excluding the most influential percent of 
observations (as measured by Cook’s D) without changing our substantial conclusions. 
Three additional issues are worth mentioning with respect to discrete-time linear probability 
models (LPM) we used to analyze the feedback behavior (M11–M14). First, an alternative 
method of analyzing the feedback process would be to apply a proportional-hazards model for 
continuous time-to-event data (Cox regression; see e.g. Kalbfleisch and Prentice 1980). We 
did not employ this model because there is no satisfactory way to incorporate buyer and seller 
fixed effects simultaneously (for the same reason, we use an LPM instead of the more 
common discrete-time logit or complementary log-log model). An analysis of our data using 
fixed effects (i.e. stratified) proportional-hazards models (Allison 2009), where each model is 
estimated twice, once stratified by sellers and once by buyers, leads to substantially the same 
conclusions. Second, in our discrete-time LPMs we did not include auction characteristics 
(e.g. the selling price) as control variables. Including such variables does not change our 
results. Third, in our feedback models, effects are assumed to be constant over process time. 
This assumption seems to be violated for the reciprocity effect (i.e. the effect of a first move 
by the partner). Detailed analyses allowing the reciprocity effect to vary by process time 
indicate that the effect is strongest in the beginning, but stays positive over the whole 90-day 
period. 
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Table A1. Means and standard deviations of control variables 
 New mobile phones Used mobile phones DVDs 
Seller:       
Seller has private profile .025  .028  .017  
Seller has verified identity .032  .038  .188  
Seller has Me-Page .086  .091  .486  
Seller is PowerSeller .016  .020  .282  
Buyer (if sold):       
Buyer has private profile .021  .049  .008  
Buyer has verified identity .015  .014  .020  
Buyer has Me-Page .045  .050  .047  
Buyer is PowerSeller .007  .005  .002  
Auction:       
Starting price in Euros 28.8 (69.7) 25.9 (57.0) 3.7 (6.6) 
No picture .050  .058  .071  
Description length (log) 7.30 (1.15) 6.95 (1.12) 7.04 (1.36) 
Competition (log) 3.65 (1.08) 3.87 (.83) 6.92 (.87) 
Listed with thumbnail .419  .352  .033  
Listed in bold .146  .118  .003  
Payment modes offered:       
No bank transfer .035  .034  .082  
PayPal or credit card .107  .082  .169  
Cash on pick up .479  .399  .169  
Cash on delivery .117  .087  .023  
Auction duration:       
1 day .142  .104  .291  
3 days .319  .278  .195  
5 days .191  .183  .112  
7 days .267  .344  .236  
10 days .081  .091  .166  
Model (mobile) or Genre (DVDs):       
Sony T610 / Action .041  .111  .403  
Sony T630 / Drama .061  .085  .061  
Nokia 6230 / Classics .531  .152  .051  
Nokia 6310i / Comedy .061  .296  .185  
Motorola V600 / Crime .089  .068  .093  
Samsung E800 / Cartoon .156  .062  .021  
Samsung E700 / Children .062  .226  .186  
Number of observations 5499 9128 339517 
Number of sellers 4341 7687 33166 
Number of buyers 4881 7454 100046 
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Table A2. Effect of reputation on sales 
 M1 M2 M3 
 New mobile phones Used mobile phones DVDs 
Seller’s positive ratings (log) .344* (.136) –.019 (.064) .117** (.040) 
Seller’s negative ratings (log) –.670* (.301) –.207 (.132) –.145* (.058) 
Seller has private profile –.476 (.865) –.532 (.593) –.583* (.292) 
Seller has verified identity –3.218*** (.712) .235 (.366) .085 (.206) 
Seller has Me-Page –.185 (.602) –.100 (.327) –.724*** (.153) 
Seller is PowerSeller –.024 (.775) –.126 (.419) –.203 (.165) 
Starting price –.110*** (.010) –.056*** (.005) –.109*** (.028) 
No picture –.883 (.803) –.594* (.276) .009 (.155) 
Description length (log) .423** (.159) .047 (.078) –.115*** (.028) 
Competition (log) –.880 (.677) –1.076*** (.279) –.656*** (.111) 
Listed with thumbnail .026 (.385) .280 (.175) .692*** (.150) 
Listed in bold 1.074 (.679) .432 (.289) .731* (.307) 
Constant 25.165*** (3.686) 17.835*** (2.018) 7.429*** (.983) 
Further covariates (Chi2-tests):       
Payment modes (4 df) 9.7*  2.5  16.1**  
Auction duration (4 df) 4.1  7.5  36.8***  
End of auction (16/29 df) 22.4  36.5**  298.4***  
Product subcategory (6 df) 82.8***  113.3***  65.5***  
McFadden R-squared .858  .678  .133  
Number of observations 5499  9128  339517  
Number of sellers 4341  7687  33166  
Note: The table shows coefficient estimates of logistic regressions and robust standard errors in parentheses 
(adjusted for seller-clusters; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 for two-sided tests). The binary dependent 
variable in all models is equal to one for successful auctions. 
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Table A3. Effect of reputation on price I 
 M4 M5 M6 
 New mobile phones Used mobile phones DVDs 
Seller’s positive ratings (log) .005*** (.001) .008* (.003) .053*** (.015) 
Seller’s negative ratings (log) –.011*** (.002) –.018** (.006) –.101** (.035) 
Seller has private profile –.019 (.011) .018 (.020) –.027 (.103) 
Seller has verified identity .001 (.007) –.002 (.019) .107 (.154) 
Seller has Me-Page .007 (.005) –.019 (.016) –.267*** (.076) 
Seller is PowerSeller .006 (.012) .000 (.034) .020 (.118) 
No picture –.024** (.009) –.044* (.022) .067 (.089) 
Description length (log) .004*** (.001) .026*** (.004) .026* (.011) 
Competition (log) –.018** (.006) –.037* (.016) –.022 (.027) 
Listed with thumbnail .010*** (.003) .036*** (.007) .321*** (.052) 
Listed in bold .006 (.004) .032** (.010) .521*** (.081) 
Constant 5.473*** (.031) 5.261*** (.085) 1.519*** (.244) 
Further covariates (F-tests):       
Payment modes (4 df) 5.4***  0.7  3.8**  
Auction duration (4 df) .4  1.3  .5  
End of auction (16/29 df) 26.6***  7.6***  4.6***  
Product subcategory (6 df) 1545.4***  979.8***  18.6***  
R-squared .844  .513  .111  
Number of observations 5269  8727  180881  
Number of sellers 4242  7474  30018  
Note: The table shows coefficient estimates of OLS regressions and robust standard errors in parentheses 
(adjusted for seller-clusters; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 for two-sided tests). The dependent variable in 
all models is the logarithm of the selling price (in Euros). 
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Table A4. Effect of reputation on price II 
 M7 M8 M9 M10 
 New mobile 
phones 
Used mobile 
phones 
DVDs DVDs 
 Seller FEs Seller FEs Title FEs Title and 
seller FEs 
Seller’s positive ratings (log) .027** 
(.010) 
-.002 
(.045) 
.016*** 
(.002) 
.005 
(.007) 
Seller’s negative ratings (log) -.055 
(.034) 
-.025 
(.033) 
-.012** 
(.005) 
-.036** 
(.014) 
Seller has private profile  
 
 
 
-.002 
(.026) 
.008 
(.082) 
Seller has verified identity  
 
 
 
.011 
(.013) 
-.049* 
(.021) 
Seller has Me-Page  
 
 
 
.006 
(.009) 
-.083 
(.047) 
Seller is PowerSeller  
 
 
 
-.024 
(.013) 
.000 
(.015) 
No picture -.029* 
(.015) 
-.063 
(.073) 
-.064*** 
(.010) 
-.007 
(.016) 
Description length (log) .003 
(.006) 
.041 
(.031) 
.009*** 
(.002) 
-.004 
(.005) 
Competition (log) .008 
(.010) 
-.037 
(.028) 
-.010* 
(.004) 
-.002 
(.004) 
Listed with thumbnail -.008 
(.014) 
.051 
(.034) 
.015 
(.009) 
.022* 
(.010) 
Listed in bold .018 
(.015) 
-.014 
(.037) 
.071 
(.045) 
-.009 
(.072) 
Constant 5.297*** 
(.084) 
5.139*** 
(.308) 
1.492*** 
(.037) 
 
 
Further covariates (F-tests):     
Payment modes (4 df) 1.5 .6 .9 1.4 
Auction duration (4 df) .4 1.6 5.7*** 4.7*** 
End of auction (16/29 df) 7.3*** 4.2*** 8.2*** 8.0*** 
Product subcategory (6 df) 55.0*** 26.2***   
Number of observations 1612 1944 113276 103030 
Number of titles   18054 15964 
Number of sellers 585 691  6901 
Note: The table shows coefficient estimates of fixed-effects (FE) regressions and robust standard errors in 
parentheses (adjusted for seller-clusters; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 for two-sided tests). The dependent 
variable in all models is the logarithm of the selling price (in Euros). 
 
